Poised to Succeed or Set Up to Fail?

A Case Study of South Africa’s First Public-Public Partnership in Water Delivery

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ABOUT THE PROJECT
The Municipal Services Project is a multi-year research, policy and educational initiative examining the restructuring of municipal services in Southern Africa. The project’s central research interests are the impacts of decentralization, privatization, cost recovery and community participation on the delivery of basic municipal services like water, sanitation and electricity to the rural and urban poor. The research has a participatory and capacity building focus in that it involves graduate students, labour groups, NGOs and community organizations in data gathering and analysis. The research also introduces critical methodologies such as ‘public goods’ assessments into more conventional cost-benefit analyses.

Research results are disseminated in the form of these Occasional Papers publications, a project newsletter, academic articles and books, popular media, television documentaries and the internet. The project website is located at www.queensu.ca/msp.

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Executive Summary

In September 1999, South Africa’s first public-public partnership (PUP) for water service delivery was signed in Odi district, North West province. The PUP brought together parastatal Rand Water Board, the municipalities of Winterveld, Mabopane and a number of peri-urban areas under the Eastern District Councils. Under the agreement, Rand Water Board was to assist in building the capacity of the local authorities to operate and maintain the water service system. The duration of the partnership was to be three years, after which the municipalities were to take full responsibility for the system.

Support for the PUP extended far beyond the signatories. The South African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU) played an important role by bringing together its members and community structures to back the partnership. For SAMWU the PUP was seen as a model which would improve service delivery to historically disadvantaged communities while guaranteeing jobs for municipal workers. As SAMWU National Water Coordinator, Lance Veotte expressed at the time, the PUP “fits perfectly with our vision of building the capacity of disadvantaged municipalities so that they can deliver good quality, affordable services to the people instead of throwing in the towel to a multinational company.”

Hopes for the success of this initiative were buoyed by promises of financial support from various spheres of government. According to the agreement, each of the municipalities was to contribute 20% of their equitable share grant to the project. The municipalities’ stipend was intended to subsidise payment for citizens who were declared “indigent” and therefore unable to afford payment for water. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) also added to the funding of the PUP with R42 million spread over three years to help make up for deficiencies in a system where up to 50% of the water which is delivered to the district leaks into the ground.
In late 1999 there was great optimism amongst all stakeholders that Odi would set a precedent for supplying effective water service to underdeveloped areas in South Africa. With little industry and an average household income of around R1 750, there was little opportunity for extensive cost recovery and cross subsidisation in Odi. Yet, the intent of the PUP was that with reasonable levels of payment and an improved infrastructure a financially sustainable system could be established in three years.

While payment rates in the townships of Mabopane and Winterveld have been adequate, in the peri-urban areas only 2-4% of households are paid up. In some areas this has resulted in cutoffs and threats of legal action. In Klipgat, the entire community only receives water every other day as Odi Retail, Rand Water Board’s local outlet, pressures for cost recovery. To make matters worse, a ‘culture of non-payment’ has developed at the top - amongst local government officials. Contrary to their promises, the local authorities have not added a cent of their equitable share money to the coffers of the PUP. Moreover, they have failed to set up an indigent policy.

Apart from the municipalities failing to honour their commitment, DWAF has also pulled back from its earlier enthusiastic support for the venture. High level authorities in the Department have all but declared the PUP an exercise that goes against the future direction of water service delivery: increased participation by the private sector. The Department as well as Rand Water Board and SAMWU acknowledge that a capital investment of R20-30 million is needed to bring the infrastructure in Odi up to an acceptable standard. With this injection, partners in the PUP argue that the project could succeed. But no such investment is forthcoming from national government and there is little prospect of a viable loan coming from sources such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa. At the end of 2000, the partnership stands on the brink of collapse. Odi Retail’s arrears for bulk water payment stand at roughly R14 million. As Rand Water Board’s Sam Shabalala observes, the failure to properly finance the project “is threatening to make all of our hard work come to naught.”

All in all, the precarious state of the Odi PUP raises the issue of whether the partnership has been ‘set up to fail’. For Rand Water and SAMWU, as well as advocates for the welfare of poor communities, a failure of Odi would be a blow to the notion of public sector delivery and free service ‘lifelines’ for the poor.

### Introduction

The signing of the agreement is the beginning of the real struggle.

Tom Ngobeni, Deputy General Secretary, Samwu

If those people themselves cannot pay for water supply, we’re in trouble as a country.

Rowen Duvel, Rand Water Board

Governments should keep out of the water business, except as regulators and protectors of the environment.


Odi district in North West province is known for two things. Firstly, it is the site of two monuments to apartheid architecture: the Morula Sun casino (poor cousin of the infamous Sun City) and the concrete behemoth known as Odi Stadium which has hosted South Africa’s finest football clubs over the years. Secondly, certain parts of the district were targets for extensive forced removals during the 1970s and 1980s. The attempt to create an exclusively Tswana community in Odi led to the deportation of 25 000 people from Winterveld to the former Kwa-Ndebele. At the other end of the process was the forced influx to the district. Mabopane’s population increased nearly fivefold between 1970 and 1976 as the apartheid regime systematically rid Pretoria of ‘Africans’.

Thankfully the days of forced removals have passed. Odi has now achieved renown for more positive events. For in September, 1999, Odi – Winterveld, Mabopane and a handful of rural district councils – signed the first ever public-public...
partnership for water service delivery. Ga-Rankuwa, also part of Odi, added their name to a similar pact in July of 2000.

This public-public partnership (or PUP) binds parastatal bulk water provider Rand Water Board to build the capacity of the municipalities to maintain and operate the service delivery system. Through a process of training and participatory development the PUP is supposed to provide a model for bypassing the private sector option known generally as public-private partnerships or PPPs. The aim is to help build the sort of developmental local government which to date has been largely confined to policy documents and conference resolutions.

This report is an assessment of the Odi PUP after approximately one year of operation. The report begins with a brief overview of methodology, followed by a background of the area, the rationale for the PUP, the context of the PUP, and its consolidation. The paper concludes with an overview of the outcomes of the PUP to date and a critical analysis of its successes and failures.

Methodology

The case study began by establishing a close working relationship with the South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu) local in Odi. This was seen as central for several reasons. Firstly, the views of workers on the process of municipal restructuring and service delivery have largely been ignored by researchers. Most focus has been on policy processes and quantitative analysis of delivery. Hence, adding “workers’ voices” to the research was seen as crucial.²

A series of semi-structured interviews were then undertaken with stakeholders in the Odi PUP. This involved two extended visits to Odi, one in July and one in October of 2000. The union organiser, Piet Hlongwane, organised the interviews during the July visit and accompanied the author throughout the first visit. The interviews covered community leaders, local government officials and management from Rand Water Board. The content of these semi-structured interviews centred on the overall assessment of the partnership, suggestions for improvements, and analysis of the potential for replication of the PUP in other municipalities.

Between fieldwork visits a number of telephonic interviews were conducted with government officials, Rand Water Board authorities and Samwu leaders. Overall, the selection of people to be interviewed was intended to include all major social groups involved in the PUP. A complete list of people interviewed appears in the references section of this paper.

Background

“The history of water in South Africa cannot be separated from the history of the country as a whole.”

Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1995 (Quoted in RDSN 2000,1)

During the years of apartheid rule, South African water service delivery mirrored much of the socio-economic structure of society as a whole. Historically white areas generally had world-class service, piped water into their houses and water-borne sanitation. Through enormous government subsidies for infrastructure white residential areas as well as white-owned farms and businesses were able to access water in quantities deemed appropriate to maintain their lifestyle and profit margins.

Historically black areas on the other hand were subject to the vagaries of apartheid policy makers. In some urban townships taps inside houses were the rule. In others, communal standpipes became the norm. In rural areas infrastructure was far more minimal, such that by the time of the 1994 elections some 12 million South Africans were without access to clean water and 21 million did not have adequate sanitation (ANC 1994, 28). The unevenness of water service was a reflection of the country’s gender as well as racial inequalities. For a variety of reasons, in most rural and many urban black households, water delivery was and continues to be seen as “women’s work.” In the absence of domestic connections or yard taps, women are generally tasked with finding alternative sources. In the driest parts of the country, fetching even a minimal amount of water for a household may involve several hours per day of labour (Hemson, 2000).

Time spent accessing water, when added to other tasks of social reproduction generally left in the hands of women, imposes a nightmarish flexible labour regime on female household members. But water has other gendered linkages to the development process as well. For example, access to clean water contributes to the general health and productivity of people in the household, thus indirectly reducing domestic labour in the care-giving sphere. Hence the upgrading and extension of water services, though often not overtly acknowledged, was essential to creating the “better life for all” promised by the ANC in the 1994 elections, and was
also an important measure to advance gender justice.

To the government’s credit, the centrality of water in the development process was repeatedly acknowledged. Throughout the first five years of ANC rule, perhaps no initiative undertaken by government received more public attention than the extension of water service provision. By 1999, although the problem was far from solved, the government claimed major advances. At the time of the second democratic elections, the Government Communication and Information Services (GCIS 1999) claimed that some three million households had been provided access to water since 1994. Most reportedly had at least an RDP locational standard of a standpipe within 200 metres of their residence. At face value, this was an enormous step toward laying a foundation of development in previously underdeveloped areas, as well as a relief of the gendered burden of ‘fetching water’ for millions of women.

However, while acknowledging government’s proactivity on the water issue, the quantitative assessments and development orientation have come under closer scrutiny in the last two years. With regard to statistics, several observers, including people from within government have acknowledged that the claims of three million households serviced do not reflect the entire reality. While the government may have laid enough infrastructure to service three million households, a number of studies have concluded that a large number of these schemes are not operational (Wellman 1999). In many instances the actual infrastructure has been damaged and repairs have not been forthcoming. In other cases, households have lost access to water because of non-payment.

The issue of service cutoffs raises another important shift in government’s approach to water service. In 1994, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC 1994, 29), in line with the Constitution, declared that access to water was a basic right and set a concrete minimum standard: in the short-term a free lifeline of 25-30 litres per person per day within 200 metres of the residence, in the medium term a lifeline of 50-60 litres per person per day. Although short and medium-term were not specifically defined, the notion of a free lifeline was fundamental.

This lifeline approach informed subsequent legislation, such as the Water Services Act of 1997. However, despite the dominance of lifeline tariffs in formal policy, over the course of their time in office, Ministry and Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) officials increasingly began to see water as a commodity rather than as a right. Researcher Patrick Bond (2000a) has attributed this shift to increasing influence of the World Bank over South African social policy. Regardless of the source of the shift, the implications for the nation’s water services have been unmistakable.

Increasing commodification has meant that the water policy paradigm has moved from socio-economic rights to consumer rights. In other words, a move from an inalienable right to water to a position where people get what they can afford. Predictably, this shift toward the commodification of water has been accompanied by a move toward further involvement of the private sector in water service delivery. Water is increasingly becoming ‘ring fenced’, meaning that its budget is cutoff from outside cash injections such as cross subsidies. Ring fencing also means that water becomes another good in the consumer basket which must be paid for in full, rather than a service which is fundamental to meeting peoples’ basic needs and rights as citizens.

Increasing privatisation and commodification of water has been contested directly and indirectly by a number of organisations and social movements. In a number of communities such as Naboomspruit, Umlazi, and Chatsworth, demonstrations against cutoffs have been held. A resident of Chatsworth in Durban, Christine Manqele responded to having her water cut off by going to court to seek a legal sanction for her right to a minimum lifeline.

But the most fervent opposition to privatisation of water has come from the South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu). Since 1997 the union has pursued an active anti-privatisation campaign. Perhaps the most publicised of their actions was the struggle against the contracting out of water services to British transnational Biwater in Nelspruit. Although the union lost the Nelspruit battle, Samwu garnered international sympathy from unions, trade secretariats and development activists for its opposition to Biwater.

The shift in water discourse and the implementation of the pro-business macroeconomic framework, Growth, Employment and Redistribution (better known as GEAR) have put opponents of privatisation on their back foot. The most common question posed to Samwu and other anti-privatisation campaigners became: “What is your alternative?”.

Until September, 1999 the union and their allies had little to offer in the way of alternatives. They could refer to international examples of successful public sector delivery, or provide a conceptual framework of an alternative, but there was nothing concrete to point to in South Africa. With the signing of the public-public partnership in Odi, a living model of what the public sector could provide was therefore created.
Odi: Demography and History

Odi District is a magisterial district of some half a million people. Up until the overthrow of Lucas Mangope in 1994, Odi was part of the former ‘Bantustan’ of Bophuthatswana. Like most former apartheid-era homeland areas, Odi has a history of being systematically underdeveloped. Industrial activity is minimal, infrastructure for basic needs such as water is unevenly distributed and generally of a low standard.

Unemployment rates are high; more than 50% in some parts. Average household income is estimated at R1 760 per month. A large number of the formally employed work in the manufacturing industries in Pretoria. These workers, most of whom are men, either commute daily or have temporary accommodation in Pretoria. Moreover, limited female job opportunities mean that households and in particular women in those households engage in a range of livelihood strategies. A number of these strategies particularly agriculture or child minding, are water intensive. Hence, water service is central to the social reproduction and economic life of the community.

Geographically Odi is comprised of four types of areas, with varying water services. The areas are as follows:

- Two urban townships, Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa. These townships contain about 22 000 older formal houses, which are owned by the council and have metred water service either inside or in the yard.

- Winterveld, a formal township, much of which is peri-urban in its structure. Winterveld covers nearly a third of the land area of Odi. Here plots are typically large often with subdivisions and tenants. The estimated population of Winterveld is about 250 000 but an accurate census is difficult due to the fluid nature of the community. As home to a large number of immigrants from Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and other neighbouring states, Winterveld is often used as a stopoff point for various purposes (Simone 1998). The somewhat transient nature of the population is reflected in the water service as there are far fewer legal or metred water connections in Winterveld than in Mabopane or Ga-Rankuwa. Many house holds rely on communal standpipes or buying from water vendors.

- Peri-urban areas like Hebron, Klipgat, Kgabalatsane and part of Itsoseng. These cover about 12 000 formal stands. Formal water service here is primarily through communal standpipes built to the standard of the Bophuthatswana government – i.e. within 500 m of the residence. However, because of the inadequacy of communal standpipes the majority of households have illegal connections.

- Rural villages, often called the Bapo Villages which are near the province’s platinum mines. Water service standards are very low here. Supply is intermittent and house connections are rare. During the apartheid years, people in these villages were not billed for water.

An overall water profile of the district reveals that by September of 1999 only about 30 000 out of the 110 000 households in Odi had inside taps. Another 20 000-30 000 had ‘unauthorised connections’ (UACs) fitted by ‘midnight plumbers’. Such illegal connections were scant in Mangope’s day. Offenders were arrested. But since the overthrow of the homeland government, UACs have been the path of least resistance to water service for a large number of Odi households. Pressure to gain access to water has been exacerbated by the promises of democracy and the Reconstruction and Development Programme. In a sense, water access was seen as an entitlement by citizens of the new democracy. Many citizens did not wait for government delivery. They opted for ‘self-service’: getting water via illegal connections or ‘pinky-pinkies’ as they are called in Odi.

The UACs presented a financial problem for Rand Water Board, which had taken over delivery from North West Water Services Authority in 1995. In addition to representing foregone income, the poor quality of these illegal connections often led to serious leaks. In some cases as much as 50% of total water was simply flowing out of the system into the ground (Louw, interview).

Through a lengthy political process which will be described in more detail below, Odi chose a public-public partnership to address these problems. The centrality of this initiative to the partners involved was expressed succinctly by Samwu Deputy General Secretary Tom Ngobeni in an address to a union educators workshop in October, 1999: “If this one fails, there is no way we are going to be given a hearing by anyone in this country.”
The Rationale for the PUP

By the late 1990s the water service delivery system in Odi was unsustainable. The PUP was intended to contribute to solving this problem on several levels. First, in an area where water service was linked to the homeland regime, a partnership was envisioned as a vehicle to bring political legitimacy to the service provider.

Second, the expectation was that once a politically legitimate structure was in place, cost recovery would be possible. Once cost recovery was in place, funding would help bring the illegal connections into a metered system and to extend the infrastructure to underserviced or non-serviced areas.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the PUP was to provide a model of how different spheres of government could work together to enhance the capacity of the public sector. Ultimately the vision was that a public-public partnership could create a system of water service delivery which exceeded RDP standards and would be financially sustainable without external subsidy. Reaching such a goal in Odi was seen as crucial to establishing the reputation of the South African public sector as an efficient, effective provider. The hope amongst key partners in the PUP such as Rand Water Board and Samwu was that Odi would be the first in a long line of such initiatives and ultimately help sound the death knell for increased private sector involvement in water service delivery.

The Context of the PUP: Local Government and Service Delivery

In promoting the public sector, the Odi initiative went against the grain. While the December 1998 South African Local Government Association (Salga) agreement with Samwu put forward the public sector as the “preferred option” other global and national trends increasingly enhance the status of the private sector.

Within South Africa, two key government initiatives have paved the way for private sector involvement in service provision. The most important of these was GEAR. Since its inception in 1996 GEAR has promoted a market approach to economic policy—fiscal discipline, a lean state, deregulation, and privatisation. For public sector advocates, GEAR’s privileging of reducing budget deficits as opposed to guaranteeing service delivery has led to an 85% real reduction in the intergovernmental grant from national to other spheres of government since 1991 (Bond 2000b, 1).

The fiscal austerity inherent in GEAR has been buttressed by a second initiative: the Local Government Transition Act. Section 10G of this legislation declares that the Minister of Finance may determine “maximum expenditure limits ...in so far as it may be essential for the pursuit of national economic policy” (RSA 1993). Such intervention by the Minister of Finance has come to be known as “budget capping” whereby each year a maximum allowable increase on any individual budget line is fixed by the Minister.

GEAR and the LGTA do coexist with a number of government measures which promote a more developmental approach. For example, both the RDP and the Water Services Act put forward the notion of lifeline tariffs for services. Yet redistributive policies can potentially end up as window dressing if resource allocation follow the dictates of the market.

Hence, municipalities have had to do more with less. Such a task is an enormous challenge at the best of times, but with transitional structures, new councillors with little local government experience, and old regime officials who are often hostile to change, this is hardly the best of times.

Consolidating the PUP

Not long after taking over responsibility for bulk delivery to Odi, the Rand Water Board proposed setting up a Section 21 company in Odi. This likely would have led to privatisation of the maintenance and service operation. Samwu opposed such a move and began negotiating the issue with Rand Water. Rowen Duvel of Rand Water Board credits the union with turning the service delivery model around: “We abandoned the Section 21 company because of the opposition from Samwu and because they convinced us to do it in a different way.”

The “different way” meant creating structures and processes with political legitimacy and capacitating the municipality. During 1997 and 1998 both Samwu and Rand Water Board devoted considerable energy to winning communities over to supporting the project. The obstacles were considerable. Rand Water Board legal officer Jo-Anne Ferreira noted that “people never associated water delivery with local government.”

Sam Shabalala, Business Transformation Officer for the Rand Water Board legal noted that “people never associated water delivery with local government.”

In the end, each village or community elected their own project steering committees (PSCs). These structures were to be the voice of the community. They were to deal with issues like upgrading the system, illegal connections and processes for reducing non-payment.
Although ultimately only Rand Water Board and the Municipalities would sign the agreement, there was widespread support for the partnership from other important sources. These included the provincial Department of Local Government and Housing which, according to Deputy Director Ben Ntoane, viewed assisting in the capacity building of local authorities as part of their political responsibility during the transition.

Further enthusiasm for the PUP and the success of these structures was evidenced in revenue increases once the structures were in place. From April 1998 to September 1999 monthly collections rose from R500 000 to more than R2 million. Pressure to pay included cutting off service, which Shabalala said could be done legitimately with “credible input from the community side.”

The last step in the agreement was financial support from DWAF. This came in the form of a R42 million subsidy for low income users for three years. The subsidy is intended as a transition measure to allow the municipality sufficient time to increase payment rates, fix leaks, and decrease illegal connections. The R42 million is allocated in decreasing tranches — R21 million for year one, R14 million for year two, and R7 million for year three (Duvel, interview).

The financial support from DWAF was to be complemented by a direct contribution from the municipalities. As part of a strategy of redress, every historically disadvantaged municipality receives a grant from national government, called the equitable share. The equitable share is intended to help municipalities which have a low tax base to build up their infrastructure.

Under the terms of the Odi agreement, each of the municipalities was to contribute 20% of their annual equitable share to the PUP. The ‘carrot’ for these municipalities was that they would receive training from Rand Water Board so that after the three-year term of the contract they will be able to maintain and operate the system, and accrue the revenue in their own coffers.

The backing of Samwu for this initiative was ensured in two ways. First, the jobs of all workers were guaranteed. Most of these were former employees of the North West Water Service Agency. Under the scheme they will be seconded to the Rand Water Board for three years. After that they will become employees of the Eastern District Councils.

At the time of signing there was a distinct note of optimism amongst the key parties. Korbie Mare, operation engineer at Rand Water Board was emphatic that such arrangements were necessary to keep the public sector alive and produce high quality service: “We feel quite confident that at the end of the day we can leave behind people that can do the best anyone could have done.”

He emphasised that the private sector option would have been the disastrous for municipal capacity: “A private company would not be willing to go into a three year agreement and then withdraw. It would typically go for a thirty year agreement by which time the local government would have lost all capacity to deliver.”

Lance Veotte, National Water Co-ordinator of Samwu, offered a similarly upbeat perspective from the standpoint of the union saying that the PUP “fits perfectly with our vision of building the capacity of disadvantaged municipalities so that they can deliver good quality, affordable services to the people instead of throwing in the towel to a multinational company.”

Outcomes of the PUP

In this section of the report we examine the first year’s experience of the Odi PUP and look at outcomes under three subheadings: finance; building the partnership; and capacity-building.

Finance

Predictably the most difficult aspect of the PUP has been the finance. Discussions with nearly all people involved in the partnership focused on two shortcomings: low rates of payment for service in certain areas and the lack of equitable share contribution from the municipalities. The financial shortfall is underpinned by the fact that in a number of areas, illegal connections continue apace. According to Rowen Duvel of Rand Water Board, collection rates are a mere 2-4% in the peri-urban Eastern District Council areas. In areas like Klipgat a metre is a rare exception, illegal yard taps and non-functioning communal standpipes are the norm. As community leader Nellie Ngwana put it, “the community is drinking water, but they are not paying for it.”

In the townships higher payment rates have been achieved. Although estimates of success rates vary, those who hold financial responsibility in Rand Water Board generally comment favourably. Rowen Duvel characterises efforts to get people to pay as “very successful”. Odi Retail marketing manager Zambi Modise argues that other municipalities are interested in Rand Water Board’s service because of their positive results in cost recovery. The figures, while showing an increase, do not paint a glittering
picture. In Winterveld payment rates are 55-60%, in Mabopane with a large number of pensioners, it is about 45%. But it is not only individual users who are reticent to part with their money. The municipalities which agreed to contribute 20% of their equitable share have not added a cent to the coffers. The reasons for this failure are complex. For the Town Clerk of Winterveld, Mr Willie Mogaladi, the issue is primarily one of political participation, “We the administration were not involved in drawing up the agreement, we were only called to sign it.” But like Rowen Duvel, Mogaladi pointed to the wide variety of needs of communities like Winterveld.

While recognising that the municipalities are legally bound to pay their 20%, Duvel acknowledges that these impoverished communities are in a bind: the total equitable share for all of Odi is only R11 million, “That is not a lot of money for a municipality with such diverse needs. I can understand why they are reluctant to pay.” He also noted that Odi’s impoverished municipalities may see Rand Water Board as a well-resourced company, not deserving of a contribution.

To date only minimal pressure has been brought to bear on the municipalities for their refusal to abide by the agreement. Jo-Anne Ferreira of Rand Water Board said that a letter had been sent to the relevant municipalities requesting payment. Nene Solomon, PRO for Rand Water’s local wing, Odi Retail, said in October 2000 that recently their offices had begun sending “indigent” consumers to the councils. The consumers were expected to ask the councils to pay Odi Retail on their behalf.

But while the issue of non-payment of equitable share seems to draw minimal attention, pressure on individual households is systematic. Zambi Modise, Marketing Manager at Odi Retail, devotes much of his time to developing strategies around payment. Odi Retail has circulated pamphlets, they have called dozens of community meetings, they have held competitions for those who pay their arrears. But they have combined the carrots with the stick of water cutoffs. This strategy has brought some results but not total co-operation.

The strongest resistance remains in the peri-urban areas like Klipgate where unemployment is more rife and access to resources more difficult. The Klipgat community comprises three sections, A, B, and C. In B and C the Project Steering Committees have taken a conscious decision not to pay. According to PSC Member Ngwana the community was willing to pay R10 per month for water but Rand Water Board was asking for R35. The negotiations broke off, and from mid-July, 2000, water service to Klipgat was on a “one day wet, one day dry” basis. Modise said that if payment did not improve, there would be a total cutoff.

The issue of payment may ultimately drive a wedge between community members. Leaders such as Mashiane and Ngwana are adamant that the people must pay according to use. Samwu’s Hlongwane, who is also an active Klipgat resident concurred, “We understand their [Rand Water Board’s] frustration.” Edwin Mahloma, Chair of the Samwu shop steward’s council and a staff member of Odi Retail, echoed these views on behalf of the union: “Workers realise it is important for people to pay for services.”

Yet, the elected leaders of the PSCs have taken a stand against payment. Similar divisions appear within Samwu as well. At its regional Congress in July, 2000, Samwu took a resolution that their members must set an example by paying. Moreover, union leaders admit that their very own members double as ‘midnight plumbers’—installing illegal connections for R400 to R650 each. Even Duvel, who argues that Rand Water Board is not a ‘soft option’ for users in terms of payment, admits that an illegal connection is a “good investment….For R500 you can get free water for life.”

Two more issues confound the payment problems. Firstly, those who already have illegal connections must pay a fee to be brought into the legal loop. At roughly R1000 with a compulsory deposit of R360 there is considerable incentive to remain outside the system. Lastly, there is the problem of the structure of Rand Water. Odi Retail is an arm of Rand Water Board which buys bulk water to service Odi. Odi Retail must pay Rand Water Board for its water. As Modise puts it, “we are regarded like any other customer in their finance department.” Odi Retail claims to be losing up to R2 million per month due to non-payment.

While there is no easy solution to these problems, in the course of interviews, two very different proposals emerged. From Odi Retail the dream was apparently prepaid metres. Modise noted that there were two villages where prepaid metres were installed: Magaliespruit and Erasmus. He said that the former had a 100% payment rate and the latter 67%. His conclusion was, “if one or two villages can do it, why not the others?”

In the interim, the measure adopted by Odi Retail has been shared consumption billing. Under this approach the total amount of water used by a community is divided by the number of households. Each household then pays the same fraction of the total water cost.

Predictably, shared consumption billing is likely to cause dissatisfaction. Two issues undermine its success. First, in many areas considerable water is lost due to leakages. It is difficult to convince residents that they should...
bear the cost of such inefficiencies in a system they did not create. The more obvious issue is that of unequal usage. Certain households may consume lots of water due to the presence of lodgers, backyard shacks or involvement in water-intensive activities like agriculture. By contrast, under shared consumption billing small households which are water conscious will pay the same amount per month. In the end, this billing structure flies in the face of the notions of being “water wise” which Rand Water Board is trying to promote. In a meeting with Klipgat community leaders, all were adamant that “we want metres.”

But while Rand Water Board primarily focused on technical and educational aspects of financial control, Ngwana and Mashiane had an entirely different orientation. Both of them lamented the lack of expansion of infrastructure in Klipgat. According to Mashiane virtually no new pipes had been added in Klipgat A or B since 1994 and what existed was “far from the RDP standard.” Their suggestion was that Odi Retail use the laying of pipes as a way to create jobs. Ngwana suggested that Odi Retail bring the pipes and the community members will be paid to lay the pipes. Piet Hlongwane, Samwu organiser at Odi agreed with the proposal, “if they directly take part, they will take responsibility.”

While Rand Water Board and community leaders had different ideas about how to ensure community “buy in” to the PUP, there was an agreement on a key financial issue: the need for greater capital expenditure to make the project sustainable. Rand Water Board Financial Manager Johan Louw estimated that R20 to 30 million of capital investment was needed to make the system operational. This would include extended bulk delivery, upgrading of illegal connections to legal connections and installation of household metres. “Then, and only then”, he argued, “can you apply credit control.”

The last issue concerning finance is the notion of indigents. The DWAF subsidy and the contributions of equitable share from the municipalities were intended to target poor households or ‘indigents’. The problem is that municipalities have no clear guidelines for determining or testing indigent status. Mr Mogaladi linked the refusal of Winterveld to pay their equitable share money to the lack of clarity around who was entitled to be subsidised: “Let the Rand Water Board indicate to me how many indigents there are.” This situation was also reflected in comments by Klipgat community leaders. They stated that when community members had inquired about accessing the equitable share to help pay for services, they were told that the money was there but could not be released because the council had no policy to define an indigent.

Zambi Modise noted that while most of Odi has not yet developed an indigent policy, Ga-Rankuwa made use of social welfare people to develop such a policy. According to Modise, in Ga-Rankuwa the first 10 kilolitres of water per month are free for those designated as indigent. At the time of the interview, only 50 consumers had qualified as indigents in Ga-Rankuwa. Hence, while technically there is a lifeline of free water for those who cannot afford to pay, in practice this is not the case. Virtually every household is compelled to pay at least the minimum monthly service charge of R8,32 plus a charge of R2,05 per kilolitre for the first six kilolitres and R3,40 for the next fourteen kilolitres. For those households which use more than 20 kilolitres per month the extra usage would incur a tariff of R5,29 per kilolitre (Odi Retail 2000).

Across communities in South Africa, the issue of payment for services has become highly contested. It is not surprising that even with the country’s only operating PUP, Odi has not been able to avoid this vexing problem. We shall return to this issue in more detail in the concluding section of the report.

Building the Partnership

The Odi partnership between national and local government, a water parastatal and democratic labour and community structures was founded on points of common interest. The need to deliver water and build capacity at the municipal level while protecting current jobs and investment brought the partners to the negotiating table and created enough trust and political will to forge an agreement. After one year this spirit of optimism and cooperation still predominates. Yet it has not all been smooth sailing.

Since September 1999 a number of events have occurred which have rocked the foundation of trust upon which the PUP was built. From the standpoint of the union one of the most important of these was Rand Water Board’s signing of a pact with French water multinational Vivendi (formerly Bureau des Eaux). The purpose of the agreement was to tender for Johannesburg’s water contract (which it did not win). According to Rowen Duvel, the relationship with Vivendi will not impact on the Odi arrangement. Sam Shabalala argued that Rand Water Board formed the partnership in order to ensure some public sector involvement in Johannesburg water delivery. He pointed out the terms of reference for the tender made it impossible for a company without international experience to make a submission.

However, SAWMU views the entry of Rand Water Board into this pact
as a betrayal. Speaking at the August National Congress of the union, Deputy Secretary Tom Ngobeni, one of the PUP's strongest advocates, denounced Rand Water Board for “stabbing the union in the back” by signing an agreement with Vivendi without the knowledge of Samwu.

While in a technical sense, Duvel may be correct that Rand Water Board's partnership with Vivendi may have no bearing on Odi, the alliance puts Samwu in a difficult corner. For while the union may be praising Rand Water Board in Odi, just over an hour's drive away, the same company entered a tendering process with a major international private sector water provider very unsympathetic to public sector initiatives.

But the politics of the PUP have yet another dimension of complexity. In the original agreement the Ga-Rankuwa municipality was intended to be a signatory. At the time, their absence from the September 1999 accord seemed to be more of a bureaucratic snag than a political intention. But ten months later, Ga-Rankuwa went its own way. The municipality signed an agreement directly with Rand Water Board separate from the general Odi document.

The separation of Ga-Rankuwa has some crucial implications for the viability of the Odi PUP. To begin with, the agreement is for only one year instead of the three years for Odi. The short-term nature of the contract has some major labour implications. First, the workers in Ga-Rankuwa municipality are not organised by Samwu. Therefore, any pressure from the union to get Ga-Rankuwa to fall in line will fall on deaf ears. To make matters worse, some of the workforce at Odi Retail is dedicated to working on Ga-Rankuwa matters. According to the agreement, all of the tasks now being done by Odi Retail for Ga-Rankuwa will be handed over to the municipality after a year. This could lead to two problems. First, rather than continuing with present arrangements, Ga-Rankuwa may elect to outsource some functions presently performed by the municipality. Such outsourcing could create a situation whereby private sector service providers may attempt to undercut the present bargaining council conditions of service and even extend them into other municipalities in Odi.

A further hiccup could come within Odi Retail itself. If Ga-Rankuwa actually takes over responsibilities from Odi Retail in one year, workers in Odi Retail who previously helped to service Ga-Rankuwa will either be either idle or underutilised. As Piet Hlongwane of Samwu expressed it: “Our members will not have much to do after twelve months.” This will create pressure on the company to retrench.

But the labour playing field, and indeed the whole arena, becomes even more complicated by the new demarcations. Under the municipal restructuring, the municipalities of Ga-Rankuwa, Mabopane, and Winterveld will fall under Tshwane (formerly Pretoria) Metro. The Eastern District Council areas will go to Rustenburg. Out of this process more questions will emanate. Duvel is confident that Tshwane will agree to continue the Odi agreement as is, but the union is more sceptical, especially with regard to job retention. This view was reiterated by Hanus Neethling, spokesperson for the Tshwane Metropolitan Council.

Workers at Odi Retail also indicated a concern about their future under Tshwane. Samwu's Mahloma was concerned that the PUP may be seen as a financial liability: “What will Pretoria Metro say about losses incurred by Odi Retail?” Mirriam Motlamme, chair of the Samwu Women's Forum, was also unsettled about the changes: “We need clear answers. I don’t think workers and the union have been properly informed.”

But the problem may not be Tshwane. Ideally, the resources of the Metro could have provided the basis for cross-subsidising the Eastern District Council areas. However, with these poorest areas of Odi going to the small, less-resourced Rustenburg, the likelihood of any relief for those ninety-plus per cent people who are not paying is unlikely. The future may be a lot more experience of “one day wet, one day dry.”

Capacity-Building

The key to the handover within the three year period was the building of municipal capacity to operate the system. From the standpoint of Rand Water, this capacity building needed to take place at three levels. Firstly, there was the need for formal education to conscientise councillors and local authority management about water issues. A number of educational events have pushed this process ahead. Jo-Anne Ferreira of Rand Water Board noted the success in the course of the year: “I can see a huge difference in the way people think about water… Councillors are challenging us.” Mr Mogaladi of Winterveld TRC echoed the views of Ferreira, indicating that councillors had been given extensive workshop. This education included a visit to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project to familiarise participants with the entirety of the water system.

A less formal but equally vital form of education has been the attempts to promote a “water wise” type of thinking amongst the community. This informal programme has included a number of public events and competitions designed to both build relations between the water service provider and local citizens as well as encourage households to understand, as
Ferreira put it, “why you have to pay for water.” Their biggest event was the Day of Excellence held on 16 June, 2000, for youth. This activity included many competitions and recreational activities.

The third prong of the capacity building is the hands-on skills training for local government officials who have to actually perform the administrative and technical tasks of running the system on a day-to-day basis. This aspect of the capacity building has been slow to take off. Mr Mogaladi highlighted that in Winterveld “people in offices” are not getting training. While noting that R300 000 had been allocated to training, in his assessment it was going to the wrong people. “Maybe what we should fight for is for the whole R300 000 to be spent on officials.” Mahloma echoed these views: “Why capacitate people who may not be there after election?”. Patrick Ntsime of DWAF indicated that the department was in the process of mobilising funding support for such programmes but by September 2000 no formal training sessions or workshops had apparently been held.

Critical Analysis

A year ago there was undiluted optimism from within Rand Water, Samwu and other constituencies for the Odi PUP. But a year’s experience has prompted considerable reflection. On the positive side, nearly everyone interviewed expressed a certain pride in the achievement of the PUP. The comments of S.C. Vogel, regional director for DWAF in the North West were typical: “I am personally very happy with the way the agreement went.” Jo-Anne Ferreira of Rand Water Board called it a “great success” stating that such PUPs amounted to acting in the “public interest”. She welcomed the impending proposal to set up a PUP in Harrismith.

From the union side, Odi was mentioned frequently at the Samwu Congress in August, 2000, with one delegate calling for more extensive publicity of this public sector delivery success story. But while participating organisations in the PUP remain upbeat, implementation has proven far more difficult than anticipated. Here we will look at a number of key issues which have impacted and will continue to impact on the Odi initiative and other possible PUPs.

Finance

The most important issue for the PUP is finance. As noted earlier, there are many dimensions to the financial problem. However, nearly everyone we spoke to about the problem focused attention on non-payment by users and unauthorised connections. To the credit of Rand Water Board they have made considerable efforts to consult with communities over the issue of payment. Apart from improving their billing system, they have also embarked on a number of creative strategies to encourage people to pay, including a lottery draw with prizes for people who pay their bills. But nonetheless, as in peri-urban and rural areas across South Africa response to such calls has been minimal. Considered in a narrow financial framework, Odi Retail has amassed a debt of some R14 million since the contract was signed. This debt is a cumulative figure based on unaccounted for water as well as water used but not paid for.

Indeed, from the perspective of Samwu, Rand Water Board and DWAF, the issue of non-payment loomed central. As Sam Shabalala of Rand Water Board put it, “it is threatening to make all of our hard work come to naught.”

Yet scratching a bit deeper, the problem of non-payment takes on a slightly different hue. For example, each of the municipalities which are party to the Odi agreement were supposed to contribute 20% of their equitable share, yet none have done so. When asked what steps were taken to force these municipalities into adhering to the agreement, DWAF Assistant Director Patrick Ntsime, pointed to the reduction of water pressure to communities. While this might affect the municipalities through dissatisfaction amongst its citizens, as a policy to deal with non-payment of equitable share it would appear misdirected. So a first step in looking at the financial picture would be to avoid the path of least resistance: blaming the poor who are unable to pay or who have not been able to wend their way through the bureaucracy to be declared indigent.

A more nuanced view of the financial aspects must also look at the overall context of local government budgets. With plummeting intergovernmental grants and a lack of capital investment, there simply are not enough resources available to make providing water service to every household in poor areas like Odi a financially viable project. As Rowen Duvel put it, “we need money for infrastructure.” Traditional leader Piet Mashiane as well as DWAF Assistant Director Ntsime recognised this factor as well. Ntsime indicated that DWAF was looking at ways of accessing finance from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) in order to
enhance infrastructure. This could be a step in the right direction but could ultimately plunge already cash-strapped municipalities into further debt. Indeed Rand Water's Johan Louw was extremely sceptical about the DBSA option. He was convinced that Odi would not qualify for any DBSA loan until its balance sheet looked far more favourable.

Ultimately the question emerges as to whether self-sustaining municipal water service in under-resourced communities is a realisable goal. While a number of important measures can be taken to reduce costs (reduction of leaks, cutting back on illegal connections) without an external subsidy from other government sources, water cutoffs are likely to remain a feature of the peri-urban and rural life in Odi.

The RDP vision of a free 50 litres per capita per day, supported by Samwu and the Rural Development Services Network, may remain the only truly viable approach to water for poor communities. Clearly providing this level of lifeline, even with block tariffs, will not recover costs in the short or long term. Ultimately the issue of financing water service boils down to whether water is seen as a commodity where costs are to be fully recovered or a basic developmental need and socio-economic right which should be subsidised.

If there is one noticeable shift in the thinking about finance amongst the stakeholders of this PUP, it is the increased emphasis on cost recovery and financial sustainability. At the time of the signing of the agreement, the dominant thinking was the key to increasing payment was simply increasing a sense of ‘ownership’ of the project. This approach to the partnership was evident in the discourse of role players in events like the Samwu Workshop conducted by ILRIG in 1999 (Samwu 1999).

But by September 2000 representatives from government, Rand Water Board, labour and the community were tending to cite moves like “attacking the culture of non-payment” as key to the project’s future success. While such a change is understandable given the increasing fiscal pressures on all parties involved, there is a tendency in this approach to de-link the PUP’s financial problems from government economic policy. To the extent that this de-linking continues, key decision-makers in the partnership may run the risk of destroying the political goodwill they have created with communities whose history warrants a healthy suspicion of any structures with power or money.

If this goodwill is undermined, the success of the PUP will then be assessed via a narrow cost benefit analysis, generally associated with increasing cutoffs and servicing only those who can afford to pay. Such an evolution of the PUP would make its actions and rationale difficult to distinguish from those of the option it was set up to fight: the public-private partnership. While there remains a considerable amount of political will to avoid such a path, especially within Samwu and many officials of Rand Water, in an era where neoliberal, free market thinking is dominant, there is a constant need to review and recharge political batteries to avoid backsliding into the dominant paradigm.

**Labour’s Role**

Samwu played a leading role in pulling the Odi PUP together. Because of their unique position at a nexus between service delivery, the policy-making process and having historical ties to democratic structures in the community, the union was able to facilitate bringing all parties to the table. This move by Samwu took place at an historical moment where all the role players in the Odi PUP were looking for solutions and shared enough common ground to forge an alliance.

A year later Samwu’s centrality to the initiative may be less clear-cut. While the union was an able catalyst for negotiating the partnership, Samwu may be pushed into a situation where they have to straddle a fence between irreconcilable interests. This potential dilemma revolves around the issue of payment for services. Officially the union’s view is that people should be entitled to a free lifeline of 50 litres per day per person. Yet, at the same time, Samwu is promoting a position of payment for services in Odi. This is creating possible conflicts of interest both within the union itself and between the union and the community. Traditional leader Piet Mashiane summed up this tension most aptly: “Samwu members won’t close their own taps. Nor will it be easy for them to close the taps of their unemployed, impoverished neighbours.”

The problem has another dimension as well - the linkage of payment to wages. As shop steward Edwin Mahloma noted: “If people don’t pay and Samwu puts a wage demand in front of them [management], they will just show us the books.”

But if the union’s strategic allies are the under-resourced communities of Odi, the union will have to confront the issue of financial support for water service. As noted earlier, there is a strong consensus from both Rand Water Board and government that Odi needs a capital injection to function effectively. Yet in the context of a government policy which is intent on stepping up privatisation and cutting expenditure, such infrastructure investment is unlikely to be forthcoming.
At some point, Samwu may have to make a difficult choice if Odi is to survive as a PUP. The union may have to either mobilise a campaign for lifelines and infrastructure investment from the state or step up the pressure on citizens to pay for services.

This test of Samwu’s commitment to social movement unionism (rather than simply protecting members’ jobs) could be crucial not only for the position of the union, but may ultimately decide whether the PUP becomes a developmental option or simply a sophisticated stakeholder structure to promote cost recovery.

But perhaps there is even a need to question the limits of the PUP. Within the union some people have expressed concern that a public-public partnership may not be the appropriate form for a public sector alternative. Rather than embodying a form of “co-operative government”, there have been suggestions from some within Samwu that a PUP creates a structure where parties remain at arm’s length from one another. This view would argue that a “public-public partnership” by its very nature may be a gentle form of a business arrangement, but a business arrangement nonetheless. Hence, in assessing the PUP as an alternative, perhaps the question needs to be asked: Can a public-public partnership be structured in a way to help build a public sector based on principles like collectivity and solidarity?

Government Commitment

The changing discourse from DWAF culminating in a June 2000 proposal by Minister Ronnie Kasrils to amend the Water Services Act in order to facilitate private sector entry into water service, shows that while the government has promoted and supported the PUP, their heart may not be in these sorts of agreement for long (DWAF 2000). Patrick Ntisme, Assistant Director of DWAF, summed up the Department’s position: “I suspect we will be moving to a private sector model but it’s taking too much time…do you keep paying subsidies and get nothing in return? …I am against privatisation but I am for private sector involvement.”

Indeed there are more than just these comments to indicate that PUPs are not the favoured option. Jo-Anne Ferreira of Rand indicated that her “biggest letdown” about the Odi agreement was government hesitating support. In her view the Department of Water Affairs “is stepping away from the project …in a situation where we cannot afford it.”

Perhaps the ultimate test of DWAF’s commitment to the PUP can be found in its financial pledges. In this regard, the government’s actions are severely wanting. In terms of DWAF’s subsidy to Rand Water, there has been a rapid decline over the three year period from R32 million in 1997 to just under 17 million for fiscal year 2001/2. In theory, the equitable share is supposed to be filling in the gaps but as noted above, the municipalities have not made any contributions of this funding.

Another indicator of DWAF’s financial stance on water is the question of mobilising investment for the PUP. Rand Water Board sources as well as Ntisme acknowledged that infrastructure investment was a necessity if Odi was to succeed. Yet, Ntisme’s main proposal for raising capital was a DBSA loan. This suggestion was immediately dismissed by Louw who pointed out that the balance sheet of Odi due to non-payment would make the PUP a bad risk for a lender. But if the PUP were viewed as an important policy measure in the government’s water service delivery strategy, clearly the money could be found. When Kasrils was at the Ministry of Defence, he aggressively justified extra-budgetary process funding for 100 times the amount required in Odi to beef up the nation’s defence force. Surely that same amount of political will could deliver a few pipes and metres to an historically oppressed area whose people played such a powerful role in overthrowing the apartheid regime.

At this stage the failure to deliver such a relatively small stipend to this PUP must raise the question of whether the PUP is being set up to collapse in order to put the final nail in the coffin of the public sector option.

Gender

As noted in the opening sections of this paper, water is an intensely gendered service. This gender imbalance was noted by Samwu in their 1998 “Vision for Water Provision”. As the union put it: “Water services in South Africa are male dominated.” Yet for the most part this does not seem to have been factored into the Odi process. In times of water shortage, in places like Odi where traditional rural gender divisions of labour generally apply, the burden on women increases. At the household level within Odi, the pressure to pay for services and for arrears has placed more pressure on women. While the Odi PUP has succeeded in building a political partnership the outcomes are far less clear when it comes to actually increasing water getting to the household level and thereby lightening the load upon women.

But if accessing water is ‘women’s work’ in the domestic sphere, in the political sphere the issue remains largely in the hands of men. Nearly every government official in a position of responsibility for this project is a man. Even within Rand Water Board and Samwu, men predominate in the
decision-making structures of Odi.

There is a definite disjuncture between the responsibility women have for water at the domestic level and the power they enjoy in water’s political realm. While improving gender balance in decision-making around water may not immediately solve the dilemmas facing the PUP, there is an important political principle involved. The PUP was founded on the notion of democratic participation and the defining of basic needs as socio-economic rights. Gender redress, therefore, while not a stated goal of the PUP, is an advance not only if the partnership wants to deliver but if it wants to live up to its goals of promoting democratic participation.

Conclusion

As one moves along the revamped main road leading from Tshwane to Odi, newly erected billboards for the Morula Sun appear repeatedly. The slogan on the signs reads: “Helping to build the road to riches.” The arrogant irony of this phrase, appearing amidst communities where a job and a regular supply of water often constitute distant dreams, reminds us that so little has changed in the poorest parts of South Africa - the former homelands.

For the citizens of Odi, a public-public partnership was never meant to deliver riches. But the Odi public-public partnership was an important advance in South Africa’s water service delivery. Largely sparked by pressure from labour, the PUP came together in a spirit that promoted a mission of redress and development by the public sector and embodied a genuine attempt to empower disadvantaged communities and municipalities to drive a process of people-centred development. The partnership has continued its sterling success at the level of building alliances between government and civil society including labour. Yet these successes, as Sam Shabalala has pointed out may “all come to naught” if sufficient funding is not made available.

After a year Odi is teetering on the brink? If Odi should collapse, the failure cannot be ascribed to a lack of political will on the part of Samwu, Rand Water, or the community. Hours and hours of meetings and the formation of Project Steering Committees are concrete evidence of the requisite political will. Even more certainly, any failure of the PUP should not be attributed to the “culture of non-payment” by impoverished citizens.

Rather, the viability of Odi revolves around the commitment by national government to their “preferred option” - a model that will ensure that impoverished municipalities have access to the resources for development. As long as the gods of fiscal discipline and deficit reduction continue to reign, there will be a “culture of non-payment”, not in the informal settlements of Odi but in the highest echelons of government. To break this culture of non-payment and revive the Odi PUP may require more than a few meetings and legalistic refinements of the partnership. Indeed the future of the Odi PUP may rest with the capacity of Samwu and its allies to mobilise sufficient forces to make it impossible for government to allow the demise of their pathbreaking partnership.
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Piet Mashiane, Klipgat Project Steering Committee member and traditional leader, 26 July, 2000
Zambi Modise, Marketing Manager, Odi Retail, 27 July 2000
Willie Mogaladi, Winterveld Town Clerk, 27 July 2000
Nellie Ngwana, Klipgat Project Steering Committee, 26 July, 2000

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Samwu Shop Stewards:
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Edwin Mahloma
Mirriam Motlhamme
Nene Solomon
Klipgat Community Leaders
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J S Motaun
Piet Mashiane
James Mashigo
Frans Masemola
Tsietsi Mawelela
Isaac Sethe

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Rowen Duvel: 31/08/00
Joanne Ferreira: 21/09/00
Johan Louw, Financial Manager, Rand Water Board: 21/09/00
Korbie Marie: 3 October 1999
Endnotes

1 All quotes from role players in the Odi Public-Public Partnerships are from personal interviews conducted by the author unless otherwise indicated. A list of all interviews appears in the list of references.

2 The International Resource and Information Group (ILRIG), by whom the author is employed, has done extensive workplace research of this nature and this experience has made us acutely aware of the centrality of gaining union co-operation not only in accessing workers but in assuring they will speak without fear of recrimination from management. It should also be noted that ILRIG has a long history of working with Samwu, including a contract (1997-99) to provide research support to the union’s Anti-Privatisation campaign and delivering a number of workshops in conjunction with Samwu’s education department.

3 At the time of writing, Manqele had won a victory in the first round of her case but judgment had been reserved by the Constitutional Court.

4 Unless otherwise indicated demographic information on Odi comes from Woolridge (2000).