Post-Neoliberalism in Latin America? Urban Water Supply Management in Bolivia under Evo Morales

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"This marks the end of neoliberalism. We don't want vengeance against those that have subjugated us, what we want is unity and equality...The poor have the right to govern ourselves...It is the hour to create a new foundation for the Republic.” –Evo Morales Ayma, Inauguration Speech, January 22, 2006

Introduction

In December 2005, Evo Morales and his party, the Movement towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS), were elected on promises to end two decades of neoliberalism. As many analysts have observed, given the organizational strength of the indigenous, peasant and workers’ movements, the potential for the elaboration and implementation of ‘post-neoliberal’ alternatives is more likely in Bolivia than in the other countries swept by Latin America’s pink tide (Leiva, 2008; Cameron and Hershberg, 2010). And in no policy area has the pressure from below for alternatives to neoliberal policy been felt more strongly than the water and sanitation sector (WSS). The Cochabamba Water War of 2000 is credited for opening a ‘revolutionary moment’ in Bolivia’s history (Hylton and Thomson, 2007; Webber, 2011), a five-year cycle of social movement uprisings during which a nationwide, left-indigenous coalition emerged to defend natural resources, articulating their claims forcefully against neoliberalism. For these reasons, the WSS in Bolivia serves as a paradigmatic case study for exploring what the ‘post-neoliberal’ turn has meant for public policy and practice in Latin America.

Building on the literature in critical political geography on ‘neoliberalizing nature’ (Bakker 2009, 2010; Castree 2008), this paper argues that since the Morales government took office, there have been important changes in the mode of governance in the water and sanitation sector that point towards a potential ‘post-neoliberal’ future. Unlike the neoliberal period, when the environmental legal and institutional framework facilitated private sector participation in service provision, today we are witnessing a renewed role for the state as planner and provider of public services. In other respects, however, we see continuities with neoliberal mode of governance. Most importantly, there has been little change in the manner by which water and sanitation projects are financed, which begs the question regarding extent to which reforms are truly ‘post-neoliberal.’

The first part of the paper describes the main institutional reforms in the water and sanitation sector under by Morales. The second half of the paper argues that while the Morales government has transformed some elements of the governance structure, public investment in the water and sanitation sector in Bolivia still depends largely on foreign donors; the government has prioritized projects to sponsor ‘industrial takeoff.’ Indeed, the goal of expanding household access to public water and sanitation remains a lower public spending priority compared to investment in the extractive sector, which has far-reaching implications for the political ecology and begs the question as to what extent reforms in the water and sanitation sector have truly broken with neoliberalism.
Reforms in the WSS under Morales, 2006-2010

Since it assumed office in January 2006, the Morales government has taken some important steps to transform the institutional framework of the water and sanitation sector. The analysis is based upon document analysis and twenty semi-structured interviews of policy makers in different ministries of the Bolivian government, international cooperation agencies and the NGO sector conducted in La Paz and Cochabamba, Bolivia in May-June 2011. The goal of the research was to map respondents’ perceptions of the main reforms in the water sector since the Movement towards Socialism assumed office in January 2006.

Since Morales assumed office, service coverage has improved, but not dramatically. Universal access to water and sanitation services remains a distant pipe dream. According to the United Nations, as of 2008, with respect to the access of households to services, 86% of the population had access to an improved water sources (up from 84% in 2005), with wide disparity between rural and urban areas (67% access in the former compared to 96% in the latter). With respect to sanitation, only 25% (up from 24% in 2005) of the population has access to improved sanitation with a strong rural-urban divide (9% in rural areas and 34% in urban areas). Morales’ first administration (2006-2010) focused on administrative and constitutional reforms rather than financing new infrastructure.

Privatization

One of the most important ‘post-neoliberal’ reforms in the water and sanitation sector (WSS)—the reversal of privatization—was in fact implemented before the Morales administration assumed office. Facing pressure from the international financial institutions, the Bolivian government auctioned off two state-owned and operated utilities in the large urban centers in the late 1990s, assigning control over the management and operations to consortia controlled by multinational corporations (Sjölander Holland, 2005; Castro, 2007). The government signed two private concession contracts that transferred control over the infrastructure of two of Bolivia’s largest urban areas in La Paz-El Alto in 1997 and in Cochabamba in 1999. Following the protests known as the ‘Water Wars,’ both contracts were reversed: The Aguas del Tunari contract (controlled by Bechtel) that served the population in Cochabamba was cancelled after the 2000 Water War. The Aguas del Illimani contract (controlled by Suez) that served the population in the neighbouring cities of La Paz and El Alto was cancelled in January 2005. Since then, the water utilities in Cochabamba (SEMAPA) and La Paz-El Alto (EPSAS, formerly SAMAPA) were returned to municipal (public) control, as part of what is now a global trend given the spate of cancelled privatization contracts known as ‘remunicipalization’ (Pigeon, McDonald, Hoedeman and Kishimoto 2012).

The Morales’ government’s stance that ‘water is a human right’ and cannot be sold for a profit has since become a cornerstone of its national and foreign policy. In April 2008, Evo Morales addressed the UN Permanent Forum of Indigenous
Issues laying out the Ten Commandments to Save the Planet, declaring that water is a human right and a right for all living things on the planet and that basic services cannot be privatized but must rather be public services. Bolivia also introduced the resolution at the UN General Assembly to expand the UN Declaration of Human Rights to recognize the right to water, which was passed by majority vote in July 2010. More recently, the human right to water has been framed as part of the Andean principles of “buen vivir” (good living).

Guaranteeing the ‘human right to water’ in the Constitution does not preclude, however, the involvement of private, profit-seeking companies in the provision of water and sanitation. As Karen Bakker (2007) has argued, within the liberal framework of human rights law, profit-seeking transnational corporations can play a key role in the provision of services. As she notes, international law is ambiguous in this respect: the UN’s Committee on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights recognized the ambivalent status which a human right conveys upon a resource when it defined water as a social, economic, and cultural good as well as a commodity (Bakker, 2007, p.439).

These contradictions are expressed in the new Constitution of Bolivia. On the one hand, the human right to water and basic services has been recognized as has the important role of the state in guaranteeing its provision. Article 20 states that the provision of basic services such as water and sanitation is “the responsibility of the State, at all levels of government.” The same article makes reference, however, to public, mixed, cooperatives or communitarian providers, wherein ‘mixed’ refers to companies with a private sector component. The role of the private sector is reinforced again in Article 309 which also makes reference to ‘mixed companies’ when referring to the different forms that state provision can take.

It may seem puzzling that given the conflicts over water privatization in Bolivia that there are not stronger legal guarantees preventing the entry of private sector providers. As Crespo (2010) explains, given the strong opposition of social movement organizations in Bolivia to water privatization, the original text of the draft Constitution that was approved by the Constituent Assembly made no reference to ‘mixed companies.’ He argues that the executive inserted the reference into the final draft before it was put forward for approval in the January 2009 referendum in order to avoid public scrutiny, likely due to pressure from foreign donors which continue to play an important role in financing W&S infrastructure.

De-regulation

The regulatory agencies established in the mid-1990s to oversee the privatization process were amongst the more heavily criticized institutions created during the neoliberal period. Known as —superintendencias (super intendants), these regulatory authorities were established as part of Sanchez de Lozada’s Plan de
Todos, an ambitious privatization plan which auctioned off state-owned enterprises at the core of the economy such as electricity generation, airlines, railroads, and telecommunications (Kohl, 2002). The superintendencias were envisioned as mechanisms that were arm's-length from government whose primary goal was to encourage competition (see Swyngedouw 2006: 58-9). In sectors considered to have ‘natural monopoly’ characteristics such as water and sanitation, introducing competition meant opening the sector to private sector participation through the granting of concession contracts and bench-marking to hold all water and sanitation utilities to the same standard.

Perceived as remote from the public and anti-democratic “superpowers” (Crespo 2000) upon assuming the presidency Morales promised to re-vamp the regulatory system. In May 2006 the government announced that it would dissolve the existing regulatory agency for the water and sanitation sector (Superintendencia de Saneamiento Básico, SISAB), saying that it failed to properly regulate tariffs and that it lacked accountability. With the passing of the new Constitution, regulatory agencies were transferred to the appropriate Ministries, except in key strategic ministries such as banking and hydrocarbons.

The new regulatory agency for the water sector, the Bolivian Water and Sanitation Authority (Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Agua y Saneamiento Básico, AAPS) came into being in April 2009. A decentralized agency that is responsible to the Ministry of the Environment and Water, AAPS’s mandate is to monitor, control, supervise and regulates the activities in the water sector stipulated by the Drinking Water Law 2066 and the Irrigation Law 2878. The Vice-President argued that the creation of this new regulatory framework would produce cost savings by reduce administrative duplication (Jornada, 2009). At once, this re-structuring of the regulatory authorities signaled the government’s new commitment to assuming a protagonist role as service regulator and provider in ministries such as environment and water.

The flagship institutional change during the first mandate of Morales (2006-2010) was the creation of a Water Ministry (which was subsequently renamed the Ministry of the Environment and Water after the passing of the new Constitution in January 2009). Inaugurated in January 2006, the Ministry has been much lauded as Latin America’s only water ministry (Assies, 2010). Created with the expressed mission of ending privatization and establishing a public water company to replace the temporary administration of the water and sanitation provider in La Paz-El Alto, the creation of the Ministry was meant to be one of the clearest signals to the public that the era of neoliberal water governance was over.

In its first Cabinet, the government signaled its intent to —govern obeying the people by appointing Abel Mamani, a leader from the Federation of Neighborhood Committees of El Alto, (FEJUVE-El Alto), as the first Water Minister. Mamani is a well-known public figure thanks to his role in organizing the
protests against Aguas del Illimani from 2004-2005. As Minister, Mamani oversaw the settling of the terms to cancel the Aguas del Illimani contract and established a commission charged with the responsibility of creating a new public water company for the cities of La Paz and El Alto.

While the state has regained control, the Ministry’s performance has left much to be desired. Institutional instability has led to many delays in project execution. Since 2006, there have been five Ministers and acting Ministers. Institutional re-organization has also lead to the duplication of tasks. For example, the development of irrigation infrastructure falls under the mandate of the Ministry of the Environment and Water as well as the Ministry of Rural Development. Indeed, according to one senior policy official interviewed for this study, the Ministry of the Environment and Water acts more like a loose federation of three distinct Ministries than a coherent organization. Nor has the Ministry managed to replace the water utility established in La Paz-El Alto following the exit of Suez in 2005. The government struck an inter-institutional commission consisting of representatives from the Ministry of Water, the municipal governments of La Paz and El Alto, and the neighborhood committees from both cities. By 2013, the committee produced no tangible results (Perez 2013).

Despite these changes, the formal regulatory and institutional situation of water in Bolivia is still weak, incomplete, non-existent or outdated. According to the Ministry website, the same indicators are used to judge the efficacy of W&S utilities, suggesting that the administration has not yet invented new “market proxies in the residual public sector” (Castree 2008). The General Water Law still dates back to 1906 and the country lacks an integral regulatory frame that comprises the multiple uses of water. Therefore, at local level traditional regulatory practices prevail for water access and management based on customs and usage (customary rules or positive rights), which coexist with the formal rights.

**Devolution of service delivery**

The devolvement of service delivery to third party providers is one of the most ambiguous public policies with regards to ‘neoliberalism.’ For the left, public participation and decentralization are viewed as processes that can lead to popular empowerment in order to democratize highly bureaucratic, corrupt, centralized states. For the right, public participation, particularly when coupled with participation by for-profit service providers, has been conceived as a way to introduce efficiencies in service delivery by reducing the costs of delivery and make room for local entrepreneurial initiative in the building of local water markets. The role of small, independent water providers has to be understood against this background, since they are embraced by scholars and activists from opposite ends of the political spectrum: from those who identify with communitarian-anarchist traditions associated with the Red Vida, Latin America’s largest anti-privatization network (see Spronk, Crespo and Olivera 2012) to
liberal scholars and activists who write for the World Bank (Solo 2003).

In Bolivia, the right of small, independent water systems that operate in rural areas and in large cities has been a highly contentious political issue. For social movement activists, the formal recognition of these providers was considered a victory of the Cochabamba Water War, and as such, is viewed by local activists as a distinctly anti-neoliberal reform. Such providers were long ignored by national planners. The plan for the WSS for Bolivia published by the Sanchez de Lozada government in 2004, for example, made no mention of these providers despite the fact that in cities like Cochabamba, only about half of the urban residents get their water from the public water company and the remaining residents obtain their household water from informal, non-state, small providers such as community cooperatives.

The government was forced to take notice of these small, independent providers due to their central role in the Cochabamba Water War. These community organizations were at the front lines of the barricades to protect their water supplies from private, monopoly providers. As the title of a recent Spanish film that dramatizes the event suggests, the concession granted to the consortium controlled by Bechtel privatized “Even the Rain” (2010). The terms of the contract and the controversial water privatization Law 2029 did not include any provisions for recognizing the right to water of small providers; instead, it enforced the monopoly rights of concessionaires over the water supply, thus rendering artisanal wells and water catchment systems illegal if they happen to fall within the boundaries determined by the concession. One of the victories of the Cochabamba Water War was the passing of Law 2066, which created a system of registries and licenses that guaranteed the property rights of small, independent providers over water supplies for up to 5 or 10 years entrenching the rights of “uses and customs” (Perreault 2008).

The Morales has taken further steps to integrate these independent, non-state water providers within the regulatory framework and ramped up programs to provide them with financial and technical assistance as part of its commitment to community economic development. The government now views these providers as partners in development rather than entities that will disappear with the ‘modernization’ of water and sanitation systems. Today, the government estimates that there more than 28,000 operators in Bolivia, known as Water and Sanitation Providers (Entidades Prestadora de Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario, EPSAS) (Rojas, 2011: 17), most of these small entities that provide water to 50 or 100 families. When the Morales government came to office in 2006, there were only 26 providers registered with the regulatory agency. Today there are over 1000.

It is unclear, however, whether these small providers have the capacity to provide quality water services. They face considerable challenges due to severe operational deficiencies: defects in the construction of systems, deterioration of
installations, deficiencies in operation and maintenance, and coordination, participation and social control. It has been estimated that 35% of the water provided by these small providers is unaccounted for, lost to leaks and clandestine connections. In many communities, particularly those located in high elevation or far from improved water sources households only receive water for 2 or 4 hours a day, or even once or twice a week (Rojas, 2011: 17). As Karen Bakker (2013) notes, the entrenching of public-community partnerships may represent a "refinement, rather than a retrenchment, of the neoliberal project" since they “run the risk of entrenching dual or multiple water supply delivery standards in poorer communities, while wealthier communities continue to received higher quality services” (2013: 257).

In order to try to raise the capacity of these small providers, the government established the National Service for the Sustainability of Sanitation Services (Servicio Nacional para la Sostenibilidad de Servicios en Saneamiento Básico, SENASBA) in March 2009, which replaced its institutional precedent, the (Fundación para el Apoyo a la Sostenibilidad en Saneamiento Básico, FUNDASAB). Again, however, a lack of financing emerges as a key problem. As Lorena Ferreyra Villalpando, Chief of Investigation and Technological Development put it, "our finances are very limited. SENASBA is close to meeting our goals in potable water; we are still very far from achieving our goals in sanitation" (author interview, May 2011).

**Continuity rather than change: Public financing of W&S infrastructure**

It is with respect to financing water and sanitation infrastructure that there has been the least change under the Morales administration. In the hopes of inspiring "industrial take off" the Bolivian government has substantially increased public investment in sectors that are considered to be ‘strategic,’ but this does not include water and sanitation infrastructure. According to the Ministry of Development Planning, between 1987 and 2005 total public investment averaged $US 497 million per year, while between 2006 and 2009 the annual public investment jumped to $US 1169 million per year. As the table below indicates, however, the bulk of this public investment (over 80%) is directed to the priority sectors of mining, hydrocarbons, hydroelectric, and transportation infrastructure (see Table 1). By contrast, the government plans to invest only 1.2% for water and sanitation and 0.3% in irrigation and dams. In short, the priority for public investment is connected to extractive industries, not investments that improve the quality of life and well being of the majority of the population in a more immediate fashion. Questions need to be asked about the developmental impact of these large projects; they tend to create very few jobs and have a damaging effect on the ecology.

[insert Table 1 from end]

Since little money is forthcoming from the national treasury, investments in
infrastructure to provide drinking water, sanitation and irrigation in Bolivia continue to depend heavily on foreign donors. Between 1992 and 2000, 58% of investments were externally financed (mainly from the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, Japanese and German aid agencies and development banks), 17% by municipal governments, 8% by the private sector and 17% by departmental governments (PSDSB, 2010: 24-25). A report on the accomplishments of the Ministry of Environment and Water from 2007-2010, for example, proudly claims that —the government of the plurinational state of Bolivia has managed to secure 835,531,612 Bs. financial support from international donors for 63 water and sanitation projects (Más agua para vivir bien, 2010: 37). Government documents report that approximately 80% of expected investment in water and sanitation infrastructure derives from foreign donors (see Table 2).

[Insert Table 2 from end]

The flagship infrastructure investment program “Evo Cumple” (Evo Keeps his Promises) has also been financed by foreign donations. Funded by the countries of the ALBA-TCP (but mostly Venezuela) the “Evo Cumple” program invested an estimated USD 290 million between January 2007 and April 2010, although only 8% of the total is estimated to have gone to basic sanitation and 3% to irrigation (Wanderley, 2009: 81). These projects that are intended to have a rapid impact, raising criticism that the program is aimed to boost government’s popularity at the ballot box rather than create sustainable infrastructure. According to the terms of reference for the program, moneys were to be dispensed within four months of a project’s approval or the money would need to be returned to the program. While this method of dispensing money ensured a quick turnover time between approval and execution, it has also led to shoddy construction, abandoned contracts, and allegations of corruption due to poor oversight. With the announcement that Venezuela will no longer be funding the program, in 2010 President Morales announced the initiation of a new, similar program “Mi Agua” (My Water), which focuses more explicitly on water and sanitation than irrigation. This program, which is being funded by a loan from the CAF to the tune of USD 100 million, aims to deliver USD 300,000 to each of Bolivia’s 327 municipalities. Each municipality is expected to contribute 15% towards the project. Again, Mi Agua will likely repeat the problems with Evo Cumple given the low level of capacity of most municipalities to plan and execute these works.

Post-Neoliberalism: bringing back a focus on power and money

A survey of the institutional reforms accomplished by the first Morales administration lead to an ambiguous conclusion about whether or not these reforms represent a continuity or break with the previous era. There are some substantial changes, but these focus on reforming the mode of governance, that is, re-asserting the role of the state in the planning and provision of infrastructure and recognizing third party providers in infrastructure development. The question
is whether these reforms are enough to qualify the new governance regime in the water and sanitation sector as 'post-neoliberal.'

The definition of 'post-neoliberalism' depends on how 'neoliberalism' is defined in the first place. Similar to the debates on globalization, the debates on 'neoliberalism' (and what it might look like if/when we move beyond it) are debates about historical periodization. As Ellen Meiksins Wood (1998) has observed in similar debates about defining 'globalization' and 'modernity,' historical periodization involves more than simply tracking a process of change. To suggest that there is an ‘epochal shift’ (such as from modernity to post-modernity) is to suggest that there is a fundamental transformation of an element that is considered essential to that ‘system.’ If post-neoliberalism seeks to describe a supposed epochal shift, than what is considered to be essential to the ‘system’ of neoliberalism?

Within the literature on Marx’s critique of political economy, neoliberalism is defined as a macro-economic policy orientation that emerged as a specific historical expression of capitalism that emerged in a ‘critical juncture’ following the crises of profitability in the late 1970s (Harvey 2003; Swyngedouw 2006; McNally 2006; Albo 2007). Deeply rooted in the financialization of the economy, neoliberalism is a project of class rule that aims to restore the power of capital over labour and break all forms of collective resistance to its accumulation project. As Emilia Castorina (forthcoming) puts it succinctly:

The main target of neoliberal restructuring has...been attacking workers’ capacity to influence accumulation. Based on new mechanisms of ‘accumulation by dispossession,’ broadly understood as efforts to privatize key aspects of the reproduction of social relations, neoliberal restoration established a different kind of social control (or form of domination), where financial instability and economic insecurity replaced class compromises of the previous era of capitalism.

This literature thus conceives neoliberalism as a project of market rule that has sought to restore ruling class power from the losses that it experienced in the 1970s, particularly as trade unions pushed for a larger share of the proceeds of production through collective bargaining (Harvey, 2005; Albo, 2007). As such, neoliberalism is conceived as a political response of the ruling classes to the democratic gains that have been previously achieved by subordinated classes and which had become, in a new context and from capital's perspective, barriers to accumulation.

Such a definition focuses our attention on the role of the state in distributing the social wealth, and the role of the provision of collective consumption goods such as household water and sanitation within this framework. On this view, “[t]he vital question... is one of who pays for the investment cost and for the water, and this is of course an eminently political-economic question” (2006, p. 64; see also Fine and Hall 2012). From this perspective, the Morales government’s macro-economic policy orientation also shows more continuity than a break with
neoliberalism. The government has not prioritized the expansion of household water and sanitation infrastructure, but rather aims to foster a new productive matrix based upon "the industrialization of hydrocarbons, minerals, food, medicine production, textiles and, in general, any [economic] activity that produces value added" (PSDSB, 2010: 73-74). The program aims to achieve this by involving "strategic partners, but under the principle of state control" (PSDSB, 2010: 74), in order to generate the economic wealth needed to "meet the demands of the disadvantaged" (PSDSB, 2010: 74). In short, the program seeks to reactivate the kind of state-led industrialization strategy known as structuralism put forward by the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean in the post-World War II era. Such a project focuses on economic growth in the hopes that the riches will eventually trickle down to the poor.

Economist Fernando Leiva (2008) calls this policy orientation “neo-structuralism.” It is structuralist with respect to the fact that it re-activates the state as the main engine for economic transformation, but remains neoliberal with respect to the focus on export-oriented economic growth. By contrast, the import substitution industrialization strategy that guided economic policy making in the previous era aimed to build an internal market, and the provision of water and sanitation and other collective consumption goods was part of the policy agenda. Within this new economic vision articulated by Morales, however, water and sanitation infrastructure is clearly not seen as a ‘productive’ investment and falls lower on the priority list.

Rather than re-distributing the social wealth, the Morales government has channeled enormous resource rents into funding its project of industrial take off. The success of the Morales government in stimulating economic growth must therefore be understood in abstraction of the post-2002 export commodities boom. Aggregate growth rates across Latin America and the Caribbean averaged 5.4 per cent between 2004 and 2007, and while faltering slightly in 2008, still hit 4 per cent that year (ECLAC 2011: 96). “For the first time in decades,” write Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts (2011: 11) note, “left-of-center governments were able to offer material benefits to popular constituencies – and to do so, moreover, without challenging property rights or adopting highly polarizing redistributive measures.” In other words, in the last decade, improved trade balances, budget surpluses, and the rent skimmed from royalties and taxes in the booming mining, oil and gas, and agro-industrial mono-cropping sectors have allowed states governed by these new governments to engage in a modest degree of wealth redistribution, social service expansion, and poverty alleviation without seriously encroaching upon, much less expropriating, the economic power of the domestic ruling classes. Rates of profit remain high. In the context of strong rates of economic growth, even conservative parties in Latin America have deemed it necessary to bend over backwards to distance themselves from the hated epoch of 1990s privatization and liberalization. While the orientation of governments such as the Morales administration have been at pains to distance themselves from ‘neoliberalism,’ by no means has there been a return to the
kinds of measures that aim to build an internal market. Economic growth strategies retain their neoliberal character with regards to the emphasis on “Export or die.”

Conclusion: shifting the terrain of the debate

During the past years, the Bolivian government has played an important role in defending water resources from corporate control, at least on the international stage. Rhetorically, the government has aimed to construct a more social vision for water resource management pioneering the multi-lateral effort to have the “human right to water” recognized by the United Nations. Legal guarantees to the right to water, however, have not closed the door on privatization. While institutional reforms—the establishment of a new Ministry and a new regulatory apparatus—have bolstered the role of the state as both provider and regulator of public services, the financing of public water and sanitation infrastructure is still largely dependent on international donors.

A narrow focus on governance structures—primarily administrative reforms—within the water and sanitation sector under the first Morales administration produces ambiguous conclusions as to whether or not Bolivia has successfully moved beyond neoliberalism. Additional questions need to be asked. The changes to the water and sanitation sector must be understood within the broader framework of the overall orientation in macroeconomic policy, which continues to focus on resource extraction for export rather than investment of public money in networked infrastructure that provides for the local population. While the Morales government has supposedly guaranteed the 'human right to water,' there is a large gap between rhetoric and reality given the lack of major public investment in water and sanitation infrastructure. As such, the shift towards ‘post-neoliberalism’ is tentative at best.

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World Bank

### Table 1

**Investment Projects by Economic Sector, 2010-2015**

($US millions)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Investment amount (e)</th>
<th>% Part.</th>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>7.294</td>
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<td>Hydrocarbons</td>
<td>7.048</td>
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<td>Electrical energy</td>
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<td>Transports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial production</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>2,1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Space and communication program</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>1,4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water and basic sanitation</td>
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<td>Telecomunication</td>
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<td>Extreme poverty eradication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Science and tecnology</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.392</td>
<td>7,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Presentation by the Ministry of Development Planning of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Washington, DC, April 19, 2010

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**Table 2**
### Financiamiento 2010-2015 en Millones de Dólares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detalle</th>
<th>Montos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japón Prodasub IV Fase</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pequeñas Comunidades Locales KfW-BID-España (Bilateral)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dotación de Agua Potable Ascención de Guarayos (Korea)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidonante PID0 Unicef</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF MIAGUA</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bid España Programa pequeñas comunidades menores a 2000 Hab.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KfW Manchaco, Manbustillos</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Zonas Rurales</strong></td>
<td><strong>178.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF (El Alto, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF PROAR</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italia Misicuni</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japón (El Alto, Cochabamba, Potosí)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japón Sucre (Sasanta)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KfW Sucre (Sasanta), Kfw Guadalquivir</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periurbanas Bid España</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periurbanas KfW, Unión Europea, Suecia</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KfW Trinidad</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Zonas Urbanas Mayores</strong></td>
<td><strong>369</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aporte TGN y Operadoras Contrapartes</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>697.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (PSDSB 2010: 84)